Michael Robert Dulin v. Gerald L. Cook : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Michael Robert Dulin v. Gerald L. Cook : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael R. Dulin; Pro Se.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation






DOCKE r*o. 13L0AM .UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL ROBERT DULIN, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
v. : 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden, : 
Utah State Prison, et al. 
t 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Case No. 890274-CA 
Category No. 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
AN APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF A PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
MICHAEL R. DULIN 
N.D.O.P. #26022 
P.O. Box 1058 
Ely, Nevada 89301 
Pro Se NOV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL ROBERT DULIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, et al. 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 890274-CA 
Category No. 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
AN APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF A PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
MICHAEL R. DULIN 
N.D.O.P. #26022 
P.O. Box 1058 
Ely, Nevada 89301 
Pro Se 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S 
PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SUBSTI-
TUTE POST CONVICTION RELIEF FOR DIRECT APPEAL.. 
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT CAN 
DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AND THAT HIS "SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE" 
CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT, IT WAS NOT ERROR 
TO DENY PLAINTIFF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 12 
POINT III PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM OF 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONVICTION BECAUSE HE DID NOT RAISE THAT IN 
HIS PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF. IF 
THE ISSUE WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, IT 
FAILS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THIS 
COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S 
FELONY CONVICTIONS 14 
POINT IV PLAINTIFF'S FELONY CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SINGLE CRIMINAL 
EPISODE AND THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT'S 






TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980) 8 
Boqgess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) 10, 14 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968) 8-9, 11 
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988) 9-10 
Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986) 24 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) 12 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) 8-9 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 16 
State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1984) 16 
State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983) 23 
State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) 21 
State v. Featherson, No. 880091 Slip Op. (Utah, Sept. 29, 
1989) 16 
State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977) 21-22 
State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988) 15 
State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979) 19-20, 24 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 14-15 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 15-16 
State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) 16 
State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 3157 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 16 
Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 12-13 
United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) 24 
-ii-
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1978) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978) 18-19 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1978) 18-19 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978) 23 
OUtah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) 23 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (Supp. 1989) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26 (1982) 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989) 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 16 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) 1, 8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL ROBERT DULIN, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 890274-CA 
v. : 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden, t Category No. 3 
Utah State Prison, et al. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for post 
conviction relief, entitled writ of habeas corpus by plaintiff, 
filed pursuant to Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989) as the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court on May 
5, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the post conviction court erred in 
dismissing the petition. 
2. Whether the post conviction court was correct in 
deciding this petition on the legal issues without holding an 
evidentiary hearing. 
3. Whether the evidence established by the court below 
was sufficient to support plaintiff's conviction. 
4. Whether plaintiff's felony convictions were barred 
under the single criminal episode doctrine by his guilty plea to 
a separate misdemeanor charge. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Michael Robert Dulin, filed a petition for 
post conviction relief, which he entitled Application for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, on September 14, 1988, in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 7-9). The petition was assigned to the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District Judge. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 
September 26, 1988 (R. at 56-57) and the court granted the motion 
in a written ruling on December 7, 1988 (R. at 103-110). The 
court signed an order to that effect on December 29, 1988 (R. at 
114-15). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 30, 1988 
(R. at 123). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The record in this case contains only the pleading file 
since no hearing was held and transcripts of the criminal matters 
have not been provided by plaintiff. However, the trial judge in 
the post-conviction matter is the same judge who heard the trial 
of plaintiff's felony criminal charges (R. at 104). In his 
ruling, the judge set forth the pertinent facts from the criminal 
charges (R. at 104-107); these facts do not differ significantly 
from the facts cited by plaintiff in his petition and his brief 
on appeal with its accompanying exhibit. This statement of the 
facts will be taken from the trial court's ruling, with 
differences from plaintiff's petition and brief noted separately. 
The trial court's exposition of the facts underlying 
plaintiff's criminal convictions is as follows: 
On May 27, 1982[,] Dulin was charged with 
the crime of Escape From Official Custody, 
and subsequently pled guilty to Attempted 
Escape, a Third Degree Felony, and was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 
years in the Utah State Prison, to run 
consecutively with the sentence he was then 
presently serving. He apparently was placed 
on parole because on May 25, 1984, Dulin was 
charged with the crime of Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. On 
May 29, 1984, he pled guilty to a reduced 
charge of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one 
year in the Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah 
State Prison. 
On June 11, 1984, Dulin was charged with 
the crimes of Burglary, a Third Degree 
Felony; Theft, a Second Degree Felony; and 
Habitual Criminal, a First Degree Felony. 
Dulin pled not guilty to those crimes. A 
Motion to Dismiss was filed on September 17, 
1984[,] and heard. It was then argued that 
these charges arose out of the same criminal 
episode for which he earlier pled guilty to 
the charge of Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon, and which he was then currently 
serving sentence. A Memorandum in support of 
the Motion to Dismiss was filed at the same 
time, setting forth the facts upon which the 
said Motion was based. Dulin stated in his 
Memorandum that the burglary and theft for 
which he was being tried had occurred between 
11:30 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., and that he was 
arrested at 2:10 a.m. by the police while he 
was elsewhere in a City Cab. He had been in 
the Old City Saloon since 1:48 a.m., had 
shown a gun, and left at 2:10 a.m. by City 
Cab. The police were advised on this and 
they stopped the cab, located the gun and 
arrested Dulin. To the charge of Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon by a Restricted Person[,] 
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Dulin pled guilty in Circuit Court. Dulin 
claims that the burglary and theft therein of 
Omega Drive-In between 11:30 p.m. and 12:30 
a.m., as well as his carrying a weapon at 
2:10 a.m. at a different location constituted 
a single criminal episode, and since he had 
already been convicted of the "weapons" 
charge, he could not be subsequently charged 
with the burglary and theft charges. 
The Court at that time gave careful 
consideration to the arguments of counsel, 
and the Memoranda of Points and Authorities, 
and denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that 
the earlier crimes of Burglary and Theft were 
not part of the same criminal episode as the 
subsequent crime of Possession of a Weapon. 
The case was then tried before the Judge, 
the defendant having waived his right to a 
jury trial, and at the end of the evidence 
and argument of counsel, the Court found the 
defendant guilty as charged . . . . 
(R. at 105-107). 
This recitation is not in basic conflict with 
plaintiff's version of the facts which he included in his 
memorandum of law in support of the petition for post conviction 
relief. Plaintiff cites the facts as follows: 
The [plaintiff] was charged with Count I, 
Burglary, a third degree felony, Count II, 
Theft, a second degree felony, and Count III, 
Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony. 
These charges arose from an episode beginning 
at approximately 12:30 midnight when a 
burglary was discovered and ending about 2:10 
a.m., with the [plaintiff's] arrest. 
An employee returned to the Omega drive 
in, located at 3490 South State St., Salt 
Lake City, Utah[. U]pon his return to the 
drive in[,] the employee found that the 
drive-in had been burglarized, and that a 
gun, a .38 Erma Watt automatic, was missing 
and this was reported to the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff[']s Office by the employee of the 
drive in. 
At approximately 1:40 a.m., according to 
bartender, Dick Calder, the [plaintiff] came 
into the Old Hotel saloon with a gun and he 
left the bar at 2:10 a.m.[. A]t this time[,] 
the West Valley Police Department was 
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dispatched to the bar because they had 
recieved [sic] a call stating that a 
convicted person was in possession of a gun 
and had just entered a City Cab. The 
[plaintiff] was arrested about 2;15 a.m. by 
the West Valley Police Department. 
The [plaintiff] was charged by the State 
of Utah through the Salt Lake County 
Attorney[']s Office, in the Third District, 
Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley, [w]ith 
"POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON"[,] a second degree felony. 
In an information subscribed and sworn on the 
25[th] day of May, 1984. [sic] The charge 
arose out of the above facts. Preliminary 
hearing was set for June 5, 1984, at witch 
[sic] time the [plaintiff] entered a plea 
pursuant to negotiations with the Salt Lake 
County Attorney[']s [OJffice and the 
[plaintiff's] attorney, Manny Garcia. The 
[plaintiff] entered a plea of guilty to an 
amended information of[] "Possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person"[,] a 
class "A" misdemeanor. The [plaintiff] at 
this time waived his right to a presentence 
report and was sentenced to one (1) year in 
the Utah State Prison forthwith. . . . 
On the 11[th] day of June, 1984, the 
[plaintiff] was again charged by the Salt 
Lake County Attorney[']s [0]ffice, by and 
through the State of Utah, in the Third 
District, Fifth Circuit Court[,] with the 
three charges listed[ above] . . . . These 
charges arose out of the same facts and same 
information stated above . . . . 
(R. at 10-11). To this recitation of facts, plaintiff added that 
he did not appeal his convictions because of advice from his 
attorney, Frances M. Palacios, of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association. Plaintiff said that his attorney "stated to the 
Petitioner/Defendant that the State of Utah would not let the 
Petitioner/Defendant win an appeal." (R. at 8). 
Later, in a response to defendants' motion to dismiss 
the petition for post conviction relief, plaintiff said that he 
was advised of his right to appeal by 
counsel, but counsel discouraged plaintiff 
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from pursuing a direct appeal by failing to 
promptly communicate with the plaintiff and 
by repeatedly advising the plaintiff that 
even though his appeal "might" be 
successful[,] there was a danger that 
plaintiff's appeal would be unsuccessful and 
establish "bad law". 
(R. at 69). 
Finally, in his brief on appeal, defendant includes an 
uncertified transcript of a preliminary hearing held on the three 
later felony charges (Exhibit "A", Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br* of App.]) and states other allegations which he 
does not support by any cite to the record. The transcript 
supports the trial judge's recitation of facts in his ruling on 
the petition for post conviction relief. The only other matters 
found in the transcript but not in the judge's ruling involve the 
prosecutor's proffer, and an officer's testimony, that the 
burglary and theft charges were not filed before June 11, 1984, 
because further documents and investigation were needed to 
determine whether the habitual criminal charge could be filed 
(Br. of App., Exhibit "A" at 29-33). Plaintiff also asserts, 
without any supporting documentation or transcripts, that the 
prosecutor at the time of his guilty plea to the possession of a 
dangerous weapon charge said that that was the end of the 
prosecution for the weapon (Br. of App. at iii-iiii). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The post conviction court properly dismissed 
plaintiff's petition for post conviction relief. Plaintiff 
failed to take a direct appeal of his criminal conviction, and no 
unusual circumstances were found justifying collateral relief. 
Plaintiff does not allege that his trial counsel failed or 
refused to pursue an appeal at plaintiff's request. He only 
alleges that his counsel advised him that an appeal would be 
futile. This is not grounds for a finding that there was an 
unusual circumstance which would justify granting the petition. 
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there was a substantial 
violation of his rights at trial such that he was not given an 
fair trial. 
The court below did not err in not conducting an 
evidentiary hearing because it was the same court which heard the 
original criminal trial. There is no dispute or question of fact 
which needed to be heard; the issue about which plaintiff wanted 
to appeal is an issue of law. The court below, and this Court, 
can properly address plaintiff's legal issue without any further 
evidentiary hearing. 
The evidence before this Court supports the criminal 
convictions of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's argument that his felony convictions were 
part of a single criminal episode and were barred by an earlier 
misdemeanor guilty plea is without merit. The misdemeanor was 
correctly heard by the circuit court which had jurisdiction and 
venue, while the felony counts could not be tried in the circuit 
court. The felony charges correctly were bound over to and tried 
in the district court. Thus, the charges could not all have been 
heard by a single court. 
In addition, the crimes of burglary and theft were 
completed at a certain time and location and with a certain 
criminal objective which were different than the time, location 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS AN 
ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
FOR DIRECT APPEAL. 
Plaintiff's first claim on appeal is that the trial 
court erred when it dismissed his petition on the grounds that 
plaintiff did not take a direct appeal of his criminal 
convictions. 
It is well-established that the post conviction relief 
provided for in Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mis 
not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the function 
of regular appellate review." Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1983). See also Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). Consequently, 
petitioner cannot raise issues in a post conviction proceeding 
that could or should have been raised on direct appeal, except in 
unusual circumstances. Codianna v. Morris. See also Brown v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). 
The types of unusual errors which are properly 
cognizable by post conviction proceedings are narrowly limited to 
the following situations: (1) When the trial court had no 
jurisdiction over the person or the offense; (2) where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due process of law; or (3) 
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where some such fact is shown that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to reexamine the conviction. Brown v. Turner# 
21 Utah 2d at 96, 440 P.2d at 969. The Court further stated in 
Brown; 
If the contention of error is something which 
is known or should be known to the party at 
the time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some unusual 
circumstance. . . . Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals 
and the limitations of time specified therein 
would be rendered impotent. 
Brown, 440 P.2d at 969. 
The trial court in this post conviction proceeding 
applied the analysis of Codianna and Brown when it ruled: 
Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute 
for a direct appeal, except where there is a 
jurisdictional question, or where the 
requirements of law have been disregarded, or 
that it would be wholly unconscionable not to 
re-examine the conviction. The Court finds 
that none of those exceptions apply here. 
The same exact issues were argued prior to 
the trial and were ruled upon. [Plaintiff's] 
remedy was by appeal. 
(R. at 107-108). This finding of the post conviction court must 
be reviewed under the standard given in Bundy v. DeLand, 7 63 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1988). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus 
relief, "we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; 
and we will not reverse if there is a 
reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 
Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 
(1967)[.) 
_ Q _ 
Bundy, 763 P.2d at 805, A review of the record in the present 
matter demonstrates that there is a reasonable basis to support 
the post conviction court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition. 
The record shows that plaintiff does not claim that he 
told his trial counsel that he wanted to appeal his conviction 
and that counsel refused, or that counsel agreed to, but then did 
not take the appeal. Thus, this case is distinguishable from 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). In Boggess, trial 
counsel had been informed that Boggess wanted to take an appeal 
but had not acted on that request because he felt that his 
appointment as counsel had ceased after Boggess' sentencing. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Unless relieved by the court, appointed 
counsel is responsible to continue his or her 
representation through appeal if the 
defendant requests an appeal before the 
statutory time has expired, unless counsel, 
after a conscientious examination, finds the 
appeal to be "wholly frivolous." In that 
event, counsel must nevertheless pursue the 
procedure outlined in Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 .. . (1966), and followed 
by this Court in numerous cases. 
Boggess, 635 P.2d at 40 (footnote omitted). In the present case, 
plaintiff claims that he discussed an appeal with his counsel and 
his counsel discouraged him from pursuing it. Plaintiff does not 
claim that he asked his counsel to take an appeal. 
It is interesting to note how plaintiff's statement in 
this regard changes during the pendency of his post conviction 
proceeding. Initially, plaintiff asserted that he did not appeal 
his convictions on the advice of counsel who, he said, told him 
"that the State of Utah would not let [him] win an appeal." (R. 
-in-
at 8). After defendants filed a motion to dismiss, plaintiff 
responded that 
Plaintiff was advised of his right to appeal 
by counsel, but counsel discouraged plaintiff 
from pursuing a direct appeal by failing to 
promptly communicate with the plaintiff and 
by repeatedly advising the plaintiff that 
even though his appeal "might" be successful 
there was a danger that plaintiff's appeal 
would be unsuccessful and establish "bad 
law". 
(R. at 69). Finally, in his brief, plaintiff says that he "was 
advised by his trial court counsel not to appeal his conviction 
because of the fact that he could set bad case law." (Br. of App. 
at iiii). 
Given the assertions of plaintiff as to why he did not 
take a direct appeal, the record supports the post conviction 
court's determination that plaintiff had not been denied due 
process of law. Even if counsel advised plaintiff that he could 
not win on appeal and that an attempt to appeal would set bad 
case law, plaintiff has not alleged that his counsel refused to 
take an appeal. From plaintiff's allegations, it appears that 
his counsel spoke with him about his right to appeal and advised 
him that it would be futile or unwise to pursue an appeal. 
Evidently, with that advice, plaintiff chose not to pursue the 
appeal. If he has now changed his mind and decided that he 
wanted counsel to at least file an Anders brief, that is not one 
of the unusual circumstances under Brown which allows for a 
substitute for direct appeal. In addition, as will be addressed 
below, plaintiff's claim that his felony convictions were barred 
as a single criminal episode is without merit. The advice from 
his counsel, upon which he based his decision not to pursue an 
appeal, was correct, and plaintiff was not prejudiced by his 
informed decision not to take an appeal. 
POINT II 
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT CAN 
DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AND THAT HIS "SINGLE CRIMINAL 
EPISODE" CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT, IT WAS NOT 
ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
Plaintiff next claims that the post conviction trial 
court committed reversible error when it dismissed his petition 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. This Court's decision 
in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
demonstrates that the court below did not err when it declined to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing in this matter. Quoting the Utah 
Supreme Court from Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 
1980), this Court wrote: 
[o]ne instance of an obvious injustice would 
be the failure of an attorney to take an 
appeal when there is a substantial claim of a 
deprivation of a constitutional right which 
goes to the basic fairness of the trial. 
Summers, 759 P.2d at 344 (emphasis added). This Court went on to 
state that "an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be held unless 
the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly not 
entitled to relief." Summers, 759 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added). 
Obviously then, if the record demonstrates that petitioner was 
not entitled to relief if an appeal had been taken, an 
evidentiary hearing on the petition for post conviction relief is 
not required. The only ground upon which plaintiff claims he 
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would have prefaced his direct appeal is solely an issue of law 
which the post conviction court addressed, and which has been 
preserved for this Court to address in the present appeal. An 
evidentiary hearing would not provide any additional facts which 
could assist this Court in deciding whether plaintiff's claim 
regarding single criminal episode (which claim was rejected by 
the post conviction court) has merit. The merits of this claim 
will be addressed in Point IV of this brief. 
In the present case, the post conviction court properly 
determined from the record that plaintiff was not entitled to 
relief and that no hearing was necessary. In this regard, 
plaintiff was allowed to fully brief the single criminal episode 
issue below and did, in fact, submit memoranda and exhibits for 
the post conviction court's consideration. Plaintiff's basic 
complaint is one of law, not of fact. The issue, as impacted by 
Summers, is not whether trial counsel in the present case refused 
to take an appeal, but instead, whether the failure occurred 
"when there is a substantial claim of a deprivation of a 
constitutional right which goes to the basic fairness of the 
trial[ and upon which an appeal should be allowed]." Summers, 759 
P.2d at 344. By reaching the merits of plaintiff's single 
criminal episode claim, even though plaintiff had failed to 
appeal that claim, the post conviction court determined that 
plaintiff had not shown a substantial claim of a deprivation of a 
right which made the original criminal trial unfair. The post 
conviction court also heard the original criminal case. The post 
conviction court reviewed the earlier criminal cases upon which 
-1 **-
this post conviction claim is based and determined that 
plaintiff's claim that his convictions were barred under the 
single criminal episode was without merit. 
That this Court can address the merits of plaintiff's 
claim regarding single criminal episode without a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing is supported by the decision in Boggess v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). In this case, as in Boggess, 
the facts upon which defendant bases his single criminal episode 
claim have already been established by the court below. Thus, 
"it would be needlessly circular to require that [plaintiff] 
return to the district court to re-establish the facts by a 
postconviction hearingf.]" Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42. Plaintiff 
clearly states in his petition for post conviction relief that 
his ground for a direct appeal, had he decided to take one, was 
that his felony convictions were barred by his guilty plea to a 
misdemeanor charge under the single criminal episode doctrine. 
This Court can address the merits of that claim because the claim 
has been preserved for appeal in this post conviction proceeding. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM OF 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONVICTION BECAUSE HE DID NOT RAISE THAT IN 
HIS PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF. IF 
THE ISSUE WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, IT 
FAILS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THIS 
COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S 
FELONY CONVICTIONS. 
In his brief, plaintiff argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction of the felony charges. 
The law is clear that appellate courts will not address an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987): 
-14-
A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim of appeal. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 551. In the present case, plaintiff has not 
preserved this issue for appeal. No mention of a sufficiency 
argument is found in either plaintiff's original petition or in 
his response to defendants' motion to dismiss below. The first 
time the issue is raised is in plaintiff's brief. The post 
conviction court was not afforded the opportunity to address this 
issue and plaintiff is now precluded from raising it on appeal. 
See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1988). 
If this Court determines to reach this issue even 
though plaintiff has not preserved it, the claim is without 
merit. Plaintiff has not included in the record on appeal any 
transcript of the original criminal trial. Thus, this Court is 
at a disadvantage when deciding plaintiff's sufficiency argument. 
However, the facts given by the trial court in it ruling, and 
agreed to by plaintiff in his petition and in his brief on 
appeal, with the addition of the preliminary hearing transcript 
by plaintiff as Exhibit MA", allow this Court to determine that 
the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's felony 
convictions. 
The standard of review in bench trials has recently 
been clarified in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a), as applied to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-26(g) (1982). The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
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Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), that, in reviewing an 
insufficiency of evidence claim, the appellate court must not set 
aside the lower court's verdict unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. See also State v. Featherson, No. 
880091 Slip Op. (Utah, Sept. 29, 1989); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). The clearly erroneous standard requires 
that "if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal 
case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be 
set aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. However, as this Court has 
noted, the application of this standard to bench trials "does not 
eliminate the traditional deference afforded the fact finder to 
determine the credibility of witnesses." State v. Wright, 744 
P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) 
("it is not our function to determine the credibility of 
conflicting evidence or the reasonable inference to be drawn 
therefrom")); see also State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983). 
The evidence before this Court is that the Omega Drive-
in at 3490 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was broken 
into and a gun stolen from it sometime between 11:30 p.m. and 
12:30 a.m. on May 21-22, 1984 (R. at 106 and Br. of App. at iii). 
Plaintiff had been a cook at that drive-in and was aware of where 
the gun was kept (Preliminary hearing transcript [hereinafter 
PHT] at 1-3). Plaintiff had worked at the drive-in that day 
until 3:00 p.m. (PHT at 2). The burglary and theft were 
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discovered and reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
at 12:30 a.m. on May 22, 1984 (PHT at 7-8). 
At approximately 1:40 to 1:45 a.m. on May 22, 1984, 
plaintiff displayed and attempted to sell at the Old Hotel Saloon 
at 380 South State Street, Salt Lake City, the same gun which had 
been taken during the burglary of the drive-in (R. at 106 and PHT 
at 12-13). After the saloon closed, plaintiff got in a taxi and 
was eventually arrested when the taxi was stopped by a West 
Valley City police officer (Br. of App. at iii and PHT at 19 and 
21-22). When the police stopped the taxi, plaintiff tried to 
dispose of the gun by laying it on the floor of the taxi and 
telling the taxi driver that it was the driver's gun now (PHT at 
21-22). 
This evidence, which is all that plaintiff has supplied 
to the Court on appeal, is sufficient to support the trial 
court's verdict convicting plaintiff. Plaintiff was in 
possession of the stolen gun within an hour and a half of the 
discovery of the burglary. He was attempting to sell the gun and 
then tried to dispose of it when the police officers arrived. 
From these facts, the trial court could properly infer that 
plaintiff had stolen the gun and broken into the drive-in for the 
purpose of stealing the gun. The evidence was sufficient to 
support plaintiff's convictions for burglary and theft. He has 
not specifically challenged the conviction for habitual criminal; 
no analysis will be made of that charge. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S FELONY CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE 
AND THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS CORRECT. 
Finally, plaintiff maintains that his felony 
convictions for burglary and theft were barred by his guilty plea 
to the misdemeanor charge of possession of the firearm. Based on 
that claim, he alleges that the original trial court committed 
reversible error when it denied his motion to dismiss the felony 
charges. The pertinent law in addressing this issue is found in 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 76-1-403 (1978). Section 76-
1-401 reads: 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Section 76-1-402 reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
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defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Section 76-1-403 reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted 
for one or more offenses arising out a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising 
out of the same criminal episode is barred 
if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been tried 
under section 76-1-402(2) in the former 
prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
• • • 
(ii) Resulted in conviction[.] 
These statutes were addressed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979). In that case, the 
Court affirmed a conviction for felony possession of a firearm by 
a restricted person. Sosa was first charged in Ogden City Court 
with two misdemeanors, carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle and 
possession of marijuana. A day later, again in the Ogden City 
Court, he was charged with felony possession of a firearm by a 
convicted person. He was tried and convicted in the city court 
on the misdemeanor charges and proceeded through a preliminary 
hearing in the city court on the felony charge. The felony was 
bound over to the district court and Sosa was convicted of the 
felony in the Second District Court. Sosa, 598 P.2d at 343. 
Sosa appealed, claiming that the district court prosecution was 
barred by the single criminal episode provisions of the Utah 
Code. This argument was based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), 
with Sosa claiming that the misdemeanor offenses and the felony 
offense were within the jurisdiction of a single court. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected that argument, saying: 
District courts therefore have general 
jurisdiction over all criminal matters [under 
Article VIII, Sec. 7 of the Utah 
Constitution] including non-indictable 
misdemeanors. However, venue has 
historically been held to lie in justice's 
and city courts [now circuit courts]. In 
State v. Johnson the Court held as follows: 
The statute having laid the initial venue 
of misdemeanor cases in the city or 
justice's court, the parties have a legal 
right to insist that the action proceed in 
the proper venue. . . . It is a right 
personal to the defendant to have his 
cause tried in the court of proper venue, 
but if he willingly submits the matter to 
a court having jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the action he is bound by the 
verdict or the judgment. 
Sosa, 598 P.2d at 344 (footnote omitted). In that case, the 
misdemeanor charges were properly in the city court (comparable 
to the present circuit court) for trial and verdict. The felony 
charge was also properly in the city (circuit) court initially 
for preliminary hearing, but was then properly bound over to and 
tried in the district court. The Court rejected Sosa's claim 
that the felony charge was barred because it was not filed along 
with the misdemeanor charges. 
This holding is applicable in the present case where 
plaintiff was charged with one count of possession of a firearm 
by a restricted person in the West Valley Department of the Fifth 
Circuit Court (R. at 91). While it is true that the original 
charge in that case was a felony, plaintiff was not bound over to 
the district court because he pled guilty to a lesser offense, a 
misdemeanor (R. at 91). The firearm possession charge was 
properly handled in the circuit court which could not have 
conducted the trial of the felony burglary, theft, and habitual 
criminal charges. The trial of the felony charges was properly 
conducted by the district court after plaintiff's guilty plea to 
the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing and bind over on 
the felony charges. 
But, plaintiff's argument fails for another, more 
basic, reason; the charges did not arise out of a single criminal 
episode. The Utah Supreme Court cases of State v. Cornish, 571 
P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), and State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 
1977), addressed this issue. In Cornish, the defendant was 
charged with and convicted of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. 
Subsequent to the conviction, he was charged with failure to stop 
at the command of a police officer for his attempt to evade the 
officer while defendant was driving the stolen car. Cornish, 571 
P.2d at 577. The Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the 
two offenses (taking the car and evading the officer) were 
separated in time by nearly a day, and that the objectives in the 
two crimes were different. The Court said: 
The objective of the unlawful taking was to 
obtain possession, be it permanent or 
temporary, of another's automobile. It was a 
completed offense at the time the car was 
taken. The objective of the failure to stop 
was to avoid arrest for the traffic 
violations he had just committed and/or to 
avoid being found in a stolen motor vehicle. 
Cornish, 571 P.2d at 578 (emphasis added). 
In Ireland, the defendant was convicted of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated kidnapping for taking a gun from a highway 
patrolman in Beaver County and for detaining two hitchhikers in 
Sevier County. Ireland argued that the robbery charge was barred 
because he took the gun from the officer, drove approximately 65 
-91-
miles, then picked up the hitchhikers and held them hostage. 
Ireland, 570 P.2d at 1206. In that case# the Court found that 
"there was a distinct difference in time, . . . location, . . . 
and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely different than 
that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, place 
or purpose.** Ireland, 570 P. 2d at 1207. 
In the present case, plaintiff was convicted of 
misdemeanor possession of a firearm in West Valley City based on 
being in possession of the firearm at the Old Hotel Saloon at 380 
South State Street at approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 22, 1984. 
This charge was a violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp. 
1989) which reads: 
(l)(a) Any person who . . . has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under the 
laws of the United States, the state, or any 
other state, government, or country, . . . 
may not own or have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon . . . . 
(b) Any person who violates this section 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor[.] 
That crime started and ended when plaintiff was found to be in 
possession of the weapon at the Old Hotel Saloon and in the taxi 
at his arrest. The criminal objective was to be in possession of 
the weapon at a time when plaintiff was legally restricted from 
being in possession of a weapon. It was separate in time, 
location, and criminal objective from the subsequent felony 
charges. 
The felony charges of which plaintiff was convicted 
were completed at a time and location and with a different 
criminal objective from the misdemeanor charge. Burglary is 
statutorily defined as: 
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A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a . . . theft[.] 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978). This crime was completed the 
moment plaintiff entered the Omega drive-in with the intent to 
commit a theft. Being in possession of a gun two- to two-and-a-
half hours later was not part of the same criminal episode. The 
criminal objective when entering the building to commit the theft 
was not the same as the objective for being in possession of the 
gun at a later time and location. 
Theft is defined as: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978). Plaintiff completed the theft 
when he picked up the gun at the drive-in with the intent to 
deprive the owner of the gun thereof. It was not a continuing 
theft when plaintiff was later found to be in possession of the 
gun. The theft was accomplished when plaintiff originally 
obtained the gun. 
Other cases cited by plaintiff do not assist this Court 
in this matter. The Supreme Court in State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 
(Utah 1983), held that Bair could be convicted of only one count 
of theft by receiving for being in possession of several weapons 
which were stolen from different victims at different times. 
Even though the actual thefts of the guns were different criminal 
acts, Bair had not been charged with stealing the guns. Bair was 
charged with being in possession of stolen property on the date 
that a search warrant was served on his house. Thus, he was 
found to be in possession of the weapons only at that one moment 
and could be convicted only of being in possession at that one 
moment. The Sosa case has been analyzed above and does not 
support plaintiff's contention. 
United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986)/ 
cited by plaintiff, does not involve a single criminal episode. 
That case contained two charges of antitrust conspiracy involving 
allegations that defendants rigged bids on two highway 
construction projects. The two indictments were identical except 
for the names of two different highway projects upon which the 
conspiracy charges were based. That case is not applicable to 
the present situation in which different charges, involving 
different crimes, arose out of separate criminal episodes. 
Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986), dealt with 
whether a defendant had been fully advised of the consequences of 
his guilty plea such that his plea was voluntary. The footnote 
cited by plaintiff is not applicable to the present case because 
the merits of plaintiff's claim have been addressed collaterally 
and his due process rights have not been violated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the post conviction court's dismissal of 
plaintiff's petition. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ?5— day of November, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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